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In this ambitious book David Ray Griffin develops a naturalistic theism that he hopes can both 
transform the philosophy of religion and help to reverse the modern disenchantment of the 
world. Written with deep knowledge of both Whitehead's oeuvre and the contemporary issues in 
philosophy, it is the clearest and most comprehensive statement of what philosophy of religion 
looks like from a process perspective.  
 
Though the basic premise of process theism may be widely known, neither of the two most 
significant moves in this book is that God is in process. The first is Griffin's distinction between 
two senses of naturalism. One form, which he endorses, is simply the rejection of 
supernaturalism; that is, it denies that divine beings do or even could interrupt the natural causal 
processes of the world. The other form, which Griffin rejects, is a naturalism that includes an 
atheistic and materialist worldview and an epistemology based solely on sensory data. By 
developing a religious philosophy that is naturalistic only in the first sense, Griffin shows that 
philosophers of religion are not required to choose either materialistic atheism or supernatural-
istic theism. Though largely ignored by philosophers, this third option can be equally congenial 
to scientists who stay true to their own principles and to religious practitioners who stay true to 
theirs. It is as a version of religious naturalism, then, that Griffin develops his own "prehensive-
panentheistic-panexperientialist" position.  
 
The second significant move is that Griffin argues that the primary criterion for any theory is that 
it do justice to what he calls our "hard-core commonsense" notions. Such notions are the 
inevitable presuppositions of practice, notions at play in action as such. Because such notions 
are presupposed by every action, even the act of denying them requires them, and so they 
cannot be denied without self-contradiction. A philosophy is irrational, then, to the extent that it 
denies these pragmatically necessary ideas. This idea of a "pragmatic metaphysics" (3 In, 5 In) 
deserves a broader hearing in philosophy, though I was not always happy with the way that 
Griffin expresses it. For example, he suggests that philosophers should restrict their fallibilism in 
order to exclude the hard-core commonsense notions from criticism (33n, cf. 361). A better 
approach, I think, would be to argue that a putative hard-core commonsense notion is, like any 
other notion, fallible even while insisting that the nonrestricted scope of the notion means that if 
it is true, it is implied even by its denial. Also, to challenge such notions it is not necessary 
empirically to "find someone" who truly lives without the presupposition (34). Rather, the 
opponent can either demonstrate that the notion is conceivably falsifiable (in which case it is not 
really a "hard-core" notion) or that the notion is incoherent (in which case it applies to none of 
our practices). These disagreements on the fine points, however, do not take away from the 
important point that Griffin is identifying a criterion for philosophy to which the majority of 
modern and postmodern criticisms of metaphysics do not apply.  
 
The greater part of the book develops the idea of a nonsupernaturalistic God, a "Holy Reality" 
that does not intervene in natural processes but, rather, is continuously and directly 
experienced. The chapters serially show how this idea transforms the basic topics in the 
philosophy of religion. Griffin argues, for example, that this naturalistic theism can serve to 
reconcile belief in God and the theory of evolution, that it (dis)solves the problem of evil, and 
that it provides a morality-supporting cosmology. Process thinkers have made some of these 
arguments before, but many of the chapters advance the issues in original directions. For 
example, though Griffin has claimed in the past that natural theology is not essential to process 
theism, he now holds that a process philosophy of religion not only presents a credible idea of 
God but also provides strong reasons for believing in God's existence. He also argues that a 
naturalistic theism like this one can not only reconcile science and religion but also account for 
the idea of evolutionary saltations without appealing to miracles. Third, Griffin argues that 
Whitehead's distinction between God and creativity makes possible a new answer to the 
problem of religious diversity. Griffin proposes that different religions seek to refer to and 
experience not the same ultimate reality but, rather, two different features of reality, both of 
which are ultimate, though in different senses. One feature is the personal ultimate reality, the 
ultimate agent, and the other is the impersonal ultimate reality, agency as such. Griffin then 
defends a pluralism in which two basic types of religious belief and experience can be valid. 
Fourth, he is concerned to argue that his naturalistic theism does not necessarily deny the 
possibility of life after death. He argues that Whitehead and Hartshorne do not deny that life 
after death is possible and that the evidence of telepathy and out-of-body experiences makes 
the idea of life after death plausible. Moreover, he argues that we have a psychic need for life 
after death, a need that includes the longing for more life or for an ideal mode of existence as 
well as the Kantian sense that those who live morally do not often in this life get the happiness 
they deserve, so life without an afterlife would be unfair.  
 
Not everyone will find all of these new directions equally persuasive. For example, the alleged 
psychic need for life after death is not evidence, nor is this need exceptionless enough to call it 
"a permanent feature of human existence as such" (233). And even if one agrees that we have 
nonsensory perceptions, it does not follow that there can be nonembodied perceptions. And 
however one weighs the paranormal evidence, Hartshorne emphasized the fact that existence 
always involves a tragic dimension and even the best life cannot realize incompossible goods. 
In this light, Griffin's claims that we need an afterlife to provide enough time for souls "to 
actualize all their potentialities" (240), to become "perfect" (236), sound escapist. Coherent 
dreams of wholeness and integrity will aspire to less.  
 
In the end, however, these are again disagreements about details. The book as a whole 
succeeds in its central goal to show that the philosophy of religion is ignoring a third option 
between atheistic materialism and supernaturalistic theism, a form of naturalism that is not a 
priori opposed to religion. And Griffin is correct that such a position has the potential not only to 
reorient the philosophy of religion but also to reconcile the truths of science with the truths of 
religion and thereby to point the way to a reenchanted worldview. 
